Official Russian rhetoric penetrates Tajik media – experts - Exclusive
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Official Russian rhetoric penetrates Tajik media – experts

By Lola Khojayeva — Since its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has notably ramped up its propaganda work in Tajikistan, according to independent experts and journalists. 

The Tajiks have been inundated with official Russian rhetoric justifying the “special military operation” in Ukraine and promoting ideas of Russia’s greatness and the West’s moral decline, they say. 

Media expert Rustam Gulov says there is a clear drive on the part of Russia aimed at maintaining its “good image” in the eyes of the Tajik public.  

For example, the Kremlin-funded Sputnik Tajikistana news service has been regularly using mobile phone messages to advertise itself as the main news source in the country. The Russian House in Dushanbe runs its own School of Young Journalists and Bloggers, Gulov said. 

“Their work is aimed at promoting Russia as a strong state that can withstand any sanctions, and develop despite pressure, and that it is expanding its cooperation with Tajikistan. It is propaganda tailored specifically for the internal Tajik audience,” he added. 

In addition, observers note the mushrooming of new pro-Russian social media accounts over the past year. 

“As a rule, it is not clear who exactly is behind those accounts. We can only guess,” said Zebo Tajibayeva, head of the independent Your.tj website. “The average citizen is not going to try to find out where all the information comes from, they will simply consume content which is presented as someone’s independent opinion.” 

“Such content is carried even by some media outlets which are not known to be cooperating with the Russian authorities. They try to present such texts as analysis, or some kind of independent opinion … but you can see Russian propaganda with a naked eye,” Tajibayeva added.  

It appears that Russia has also been trying to use some Tajik celebrities for propaganda purposes. 

The popular musician, drummer Olim Shirinov, leader of the band Parem, opened his own Telegram channel SHIRINOV in March 2022. Through the channel he has been following the “special military operation”, including by welcoming Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian towns.   

In a comment after the September meeting between the Central Asian leaders and US President Joe Biden, Shirinov warned that Tajikistan “should be careful about military cooperation with the United States: firstly, because it cannot replace similar cooperation with Russia; secondly, because if Russia leaves [Tajikistan], it will open the door to radicals from Afghanistan”.  

Another new author writing on relations with Russia is a certain Sadaf Nazarov, who is not known to the Tajik journalistic community. He has over the past year authored a series of Russian language pro-Russian publications in various Tajik media outlets. 

One of his articles described the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation as “a guarantor of the Central Asian region’s security”.  

Bakhmaniyor Nodirov, director of Asia Plus media group, said that in addition to using fake bloggers and fake journalists, the Russian government often uses small, little-known private websites, as it is easier to entice them with money. 

“Today we can see dozens of social media accounts of various kinds, and a couple of ‘information websites’ which openly promote the Russian agenda and support Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine,” he said. 

The experts note that apart from support for the war on Ukraine, such accounts also carry homophobic content, presenting the LGBT community as a threat to Tajik culture, which usually triggers a strongly negative public reaction. 

Media expert Abdumalik Kadyrov, however, said that despite the emergence of many pro-Russian accounts, and publications by unknown authors, there are areas where Russian propaganda is failing. 

He said that “serious” Tajik media outlets have stopped using Russian information sources as a reference point.  

“Meanwhile the state media have been given instructions not to mention the war in Ukraine at all,” he said.  

“In essence Russian propaganda is limited to small media organisations and anonymous social media accounts,” Kadyrov said. 

Regarding Russia’s efforts to target Central Asian migrants in Russia with their state propaganda, Kadyrov said that the migrants were “beginning to see that Russia’s only goal is to recruit them for the war and solve Russia’s issues at the cost of their lives”.  

“They are not prepared for that kind of sacrifice,” he added. 

However, Tajiks remain highly vulnerable to Russian official propaganda. One reason is the absence of access to independent information about international events.  

Marat Mamadshoyev, the Tajik representative of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, has said that the Tajik media have “outsourced” coverage of international issues to the official Russian media. 

“As a result, every day Tajiks are listening to opinions of mad [Russian] journalists,” he said.  

Another factor is the popularity of Russian television channels among Tajiks. TV remains the main source of information for 96 percent of Tajiks, according to a poll conducted by the Zerkalo Centre for Social Research and Media Consulting in February 2022. Of those 2,500 polled, 92 percent use Tajik TV channels, 32 percent Russian, 27.4 percent Uzbek and 24.95 percent Iranian. 




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