Uncompetitive mass media as the threat for national security of Kazakhstan

Dosym Satpayev

When we talk about the development level of information space in Kazakhstan, I would not like to refer to the numerous ratings that assess the freedom of speech in the world, as well as an evaluation approach that does not always close to objectivity. At the same time, the lack of freedom of speech in many post-Soviet countries is a natural phenomenon for any political system where political pluralism is replaced by a «oligarchic pluralism», or information monopoly.
It should be understood that such approaches are not the best way to affect the information policy of the authorities because they had already worked out long immunity to external and internal criticism in this regard. Moreover in reply they give a lot of arguments in regard of new ideological counter-style «sovereign democracy» or «third way». The only thing that worries Soviet elite, the core of its mass, is economic survival and political self-preservation. Under such circumstances, talks about competitive media do not make sense because they are often seen as a threat to achieve these goals.
There is also a problem in defining the criteria for finding out competitiveness of the media. In terms of power only media which are funded by the government are competitive. Others, particularly business, believes that the basis of that competitiveness must be based on only profits and returns. Others assume that media competitiveness is about the performance of classical social function of the media, namely information and integration of society. In the case of Kazakhstan, you can agree with Kazakh journalist Sergei Duvanov, who believes that governmental and pro-government media cannot fully compete with:
а) foreign (mostly Russian) media;
б) independent (from the government) Kazakhstan newspapers.
In their turn, non-governmental, opposition media are under the dual: internal and external pressure. On the one hand, their own state, on the other hand the foreign media holdings. Although we can observe in Kazakhstan an objective process of monopolization in all spheres of Kazakh life, not only in the informational. 
With regard to international practice, there are quite a few models to improve the competitiveness of information space. But I would like to touch on just two of them:
1. Governmental support in creating certain competitive mass media units.
2. Governmental support in creating competitive environment in the country for development of all mass media.
The second option is more promising because it underlines competitive of informational space in the country, but not just individual media entities. And this is a very important point, because the absence of such space, consisting of a large number of competing media, is a setback to the national security of Kazakhstan in two ways:
Firstly it forms an information blockade, which occurs around the decision-making centres. In the future, this could harm the very political system of Kazakhstan, which loses an important component of maintaining their own survival, such as the availability of alternative channels of information. As someone said: «Censorship as an appendix: in passive state is no use, in active dangerous». And here it is not to be confused information security of the state with information security for the elite and national interests with the interests of the government. These are different things as information security; in its classical definition is the state of protection of national interests in the information sphere. For this purpose, national interests are understood as interests of the individual, society and state, rather than the ruling groups.
And here it is interesting to consider a mechanism for the circulation of information within the political system, which already exists in Kazakhstan. To do so it would be acceptable to consider political communication of K. Deutsche consisting of the following:
— external environment (society);
— effectors (decision executors, bureaucratically developed apparatus);
— receptors (accepting blocs, busy with coding, selection of information and data analysis);
— bloc of memories and values (political experience and traditions);
— decision making centers. 
In our case, circulation of political information has been disturbed. This is due to the fact that, at all levels of selection and filtering information is being distorted, virtualization towards the positive developments, processes and outcomes. Often external information simply does not reach the centre of decision-making. All of this leads to the fact that this centre often uses the wrong data on environmental reality, leading to inadequate response to demands coming from outside. This creates the effect of delays and impedes the functioning of the mechanism of difficult situations pre-emption. 
For this moment we could mention two major forms of political communication which is typical for many post-Soviet political systems:  
1. Communication through informal contacts (direct or internal lobbying). The broker in this form of communication is the man in possession of technology «Know how» (known how to do this) + «Know who» (to know who might be useful). This type of communication relies heavily on institutional pressure groups operating inside the political system.
2. Communication, through the use of the media (indirect lobbying). The pressure on the institutions of political power by forming favourable to the interest group public opinion. In most cases, existing media or are under government control, or a tool in combating various financial-industrial groups and political elite. The latter are often appeal to public opinion, but only to show the public authorities real or perceived support of the public for their initiatives. Incidentally, the information strategy of the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2007-2008, also describes the vulnerability of information capacity of the government, as the media resources are divided among the main oligarchic groups. On the other hand, this same strategy, to the aims and objectives of the information policy of Kazakhstan was charged following goals:

The goals and objectives of information policy in Kazakhstan
1. Creating the necessary conditions for a breakthrough of Kazakhstan in the 50 competitive nations in the world, mobilizing the nation on the base of patriotic platform to support the president’s «breakthrough policy».
2. Increase of public trust to the president and creation of favorable environment for action of government and executive power.
3. Creation of informational mechanism that would not allow relating unpopular reforms in the minds of population with the president’s actions.
4. Further development of the ideological base of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the development and introduction of new ideas (new Kazakhstan in the new world economic liberalization, competitiveness in the global market, quality of life, new generation, the new role of the administrative system, etc.).
It is interesting to note that there are no reference about need of support and development of competitive information space, main players of which are local media
Secondly, the lack of competitive media condemns Kazakhstan on the periphery of information, where we become consumers of foreign and alien ideology that is now happening in the context of the primacy of trans-national media empires. Specialists note: «If the State would not be able to enter into the world of information and telecommunications systems as an independent player, the independence and sovereignty of the state would be called into question».
 Despite the apparent diversity of programs offered by trans-national media, according to American scholar M. Parenti, of the predominantly unified menu focuses on the values of the free market, equality of opportunity, individualism and consumerism, nearly all multinational media empires based in industrialized countries. The major discourse of news programs broadcasted by media empires «reflects the view of «major nations». Since recently Russian falls in this category, it seriously dominates the information space of Kazakhstan. In particular it is recognized even by some Russian experts. For example, Alexei Vlasov believes that Russian TV channels in Kazakhstan still dominate as one of the main channels of information.

Conclusion
1. Existing rules of informational game in Kazakhstan do not yet establish four most important conditions necessary for increase in the role of and quality of mass media:  
— Absence of self-censorship.
— Freedom from unjustified interference in the mass media activities.
— Opinion pluralism in mass media.
— Free access to necessary information.
2. Now we see two conflicting trends, on the one hand, political and information environment ripe and ready for expansion. And there is an intellectual, human, institutional and financial capacity for this. But on the other hand there is process of artificial restrictions on this trend by the State.
3. Information space is not formed from the media alone, but from their owners in the face of: State, financial-industrial groups and parties associated with the same financial-industrial groups and the state, which form a putative «pluralism». Media becomes a tool for influence and resources and in this fight the public interest is minimal.
4. Experience from different countries of the world has shown that public television can take its niche among the media. But for this TV needs not only permanent funding, including from TV viewers, but also a favourable political environment in which this television will work on the viewer but not on political expediency.

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